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INTRODUCTION 
As of the writing of this article, trade issues are brewing between the United 
States and China. At the beginning of 2018, the United States imposed tariffs on 
imported solar panels and washing machines, and China responded by initiating 
an anti-dumping investigation into U.S. sorghum. On March 8th, President 
Trump announced steel and aluminum tariffs with China being one of the 
primary targets. The tariffs affect $2.8 billion worth of Chinese imports, based on 
Census USA Trade Data. Within two weeks, China responded by announcing a 
list of 128 U.S. products that are the targets of retaliatory tariffs and of about $3 
billion trade value (The Chinese Ministry of Commerce, 2018).1 The list notably 
included pork products and ethanol, which are of critical importance to the U.S. 
Midwest. China’s announcement came right after President Trump’s proposal of 
further tariffs on up to $60 billion worth of Chinese imports, investment 
restrictions, student visa restrictions, and bringing disputes over China’s trade 
practices to attention of the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Rueters, 2018; 
Wall Street Journal, 2018).  
 
The United States exports over $24.1 billion worth of agricultural AND AG-
RELATED products to China every year (USDA FAS GATS) and has an 
approximate $13.6 billion trade surplus, thus it is difficult to overestimate the 
importance of the trade relationship. Stakeholders in the U.S. agricultural 
industry are nervously speculating China’s next move, fearing that other 
agricultural products, as was true for sorghum, will be the target for retaliatory 
measures. The most feared outcome is that China will erect prohibitive trade 
barriers against U.S. soybeans, which currently account for 66% of the total U.S. 
agricultural exports to China (USDA FAS GATS). While speculation is abundant, 
there is a scarcity of data-driven analysis and insights to help understand and 
anticipate China’s actions during these trade tensions. While no one can predict 
the future, we hope to shed light on some key guiding principles of China’s 
potential actions in the future by analyzing previous agricultural trade 
retaliations involving the United States and other countries.  
                                                 
1 China’s proposed list of products has two parts. The first part of the list (containing fruits and 
nuts, wines, ethanol, ginseng, and steel pipes) will be effective if agreements are not reached 
within an unspecified deadline. The second part of this list, containing pork products and recycled 
aluminum, will be effective after China “further evaluates the impacts of U.S. measures.” In terms 
of targeted trade flow, the first part of the list targets $0.98 billion of U.S. products annually, 
while the second part targets $2.0 billion of U.S. products annually (The Chinese Ministry of 
Commerce, 2018). Together, about $2 billion dollars of U.S. agricultural exports could be affected 
(USDA, 2018). As we show later in the article, such proportional response is typical for China in 
trade spats with the United States. 
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China’s Previous Agricultural Trade Retaliations  
 
Tires vs. Chicken 2009 
In April 2009, the United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, 
Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union filed a 
complaint against China with the United States International Trade Commission 
(USITC). The USITC determined that some tires from China were being imported 
in quantities or under conditions that were causing market disruption for domestic 
producers (USITC, 2009). In September 2009, President Obama announced a 
tariff increase—35% the first year, 30% the second year, and 25% the third year—
on tires from China, which at the time were valued at $2.1 billion annually (New 
York Times, 2009).  
China filed a WTO complaint, which it ultimately lost, and initiated its own anti-
dumping investigations into U.S. broiler chicken products (The Chinese Ministry 
of Commerce, 2009). China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOC) began their 
investigation days after the U.S. announcement, and a year later announced that 
China would impose an anti-dumping tariff of 50.3%–105.4% on U.S. broiler 
products (CBS News, 2010). The value of broiler products exported from the 
United States to China was $800 million in the previous year, which constitutes a 
smaller, but somewhat comparable, trade flow to the Chinese tires targeted by the 
United States.  
The U.S. tariff against Chinese tires was effective in limiting Chinese exports—the 
trade value of tires exported from China to the United States decreased 23% from 
2008 to 2010 (UN Comtrade). However, China’s tariff on U.S. broiler chicken was 
even more effective—the value of U.S. broiler chicken exports to China dropped 
83% from 2009 to 2010 ($660 million). Before the tariff, U.S. broiler chickens 
were the third-most valuable agriculture-related commodity exported to China 
(USDA FAS GATS), after the tariff they fell to thirteenth. Soon after, a further 
round of sanctions would decrease U.S. broiler chicken exports to China to almost 
zero. While China only accounted for 18% of total U.S. chicken exports in 2009, it 
was crucial for U.S. producers. About half of the chicken exported to China was in 
the form of chicken feet, which has a near-zero value for U.S. consumers, but is 
considered a delicacy in China. Selling chicken feet to China had been an important 
source of profit for a U.S. industry with thin profit margins. 
All this is done with little cost to China. Although popular, chicken feet are a snack 
food and far from an essential product for China’s consumers. Furthermore, China 
was able to shift imports from the United States to other countries. Figure 1 shows 
that the $511 million decrease in imports from the United States was accompanied 
by a $636 million increase in imports from other countries. 
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Figure 1. Chicken trade between the U.S., China, and the rest of the 
world (ROW) 
Source: USDA FAS GATS, FAS U.S. Trade Data, and UN Comtrade Data. 
Solar panels and washing machines vs. sorghum 2017 
In January 2018, after a three-month anti-dumping investigation, President 
Trump approved a 30% tariff on solar panels, most of which come from China, 
and a 20% tariff on washing machines. Within two weeks, China responded by 
initiating an anti-dumping investigation on U.S. sorghum (The Chinese Ministry 
of Commerce, 2018). As with broiler chickens, China responded proportionally by 
choosing a commodity with a smaller, yet comparable, trade value ($837 million) 
relative to the U.S. targets ($1.4 billion for solar panels and $0.2 billion for 
washing machines) (UN Comtrade) (see Table 1). If China does impose an import 
tariff on U.S. sorghum, it is expected be significant—38% of the sorghum 
produced in the United States and 81% of total U.S. sorghum exports go to China. 
Although China heavily relies on U.S. sorghum (82% of imports and 51% of 
domestic consumption), it is mainly used for livestock feed, so there are plenty of 
substitutes such as other coarse grains and corn (World-Grain.com, 2018). 
Therefore, the domestic cost to China is likely to be small. 
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Table 1. Summary of two Chinese retaliations on  
U.S. agricultural exports 
 Case 1 Case 2 
U.S. target products  Solar panels, Washing machines 
Certain tires 
 
U.S. target trade value $1.6 billion $2.19 billion 
U.S. investigation start date 09/19/2017 04/29/2009 
U.S. decision announcement date 01/22/2018 09/17/2009 
China’s target products Sorghum Broiler products 
China’s target trade value $0.84 billion $0.79 billion 
China announcement date 02/04/2018 09/27/2009 
US % in China’s import (quantity) 82% 69% 
US% in China’s consumption 
(quantity) 52% 7% 
China’s import in world’s total export 
(quantity) 72% 11% 
China’s import in world’s total 
production (quantity) 10% 1% 
Data sources: USDA FAS GATS, UN Comtrade data, and authors’ calculations. 
 
This sorghum retaliation is especially useful in shedding light on China’s 
intentions, due to the striking similarity between sorghum and soybeans. China 
imported minuscule amounts of sorghum from the United States before 2013. 
However, as China’s price support policies for corn significantly drove up corn 
prices for feed, and corn shipments from the United States were found to have an 
unapproved genetic trait, China’s demand for feed grains was directed to 
sorghum (Wu and Zhang, 2016). China immediately became the dominant 
importer and the driver for U.S. sorghum production growth. At its peak in 2015, 
U.S. sorghum production reached 2.4 times the 2012 level, mostly due to China’s 
import demand (USDA PSD Data), as shown in Figure 2. It is fair to say that 
China’s market and policy developments have wildly swung the U.S. sorghum 
industry. The rise of U.S. soybean production due to China’s import demand is an 
exaggerated version of the sorghum story, raising concerns that soybeans could 
be used in possible trade retaliation. 
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Figure 2 Sorghum trade between the U.S., China, and the rest of the 
world (ROW) 
Source: USDA FAS GATS, FAS U.S. Trade Data, and UN Comtrade data. 
Being the world’s second-largest importer of agricultural and related products 
after the United States, China wields significant power in trade. Beyond the two 
retaliations on the United States, China has also used agricultural trade as a 
weapon against other countries, often for political rather than economic reasons. 
For example, China refused bananas from the Philippines amid the territorial 
dispute over Scarborough Shoal Islands in 2012 (New York Times, 2012), and 
blocked salmon from Norway in 2010 after a Nobel Peace Prize was given to 
Chinese dissident Xiaobo Liu (Quartz, 2017). In both cases, health concerns were 
cited. Salmon and bananas accounted for 21% and 34% of the total agricultural 
and related product exports to China by Norway and the Philippines, 
respectively, before the restrictions (USDA FAS GATS). By choosing these 
products, China exhibited more assertiveness in trade disputes with smaller 
countries. China has used non-tariff measures on the United States (although not 
clear cases of retaliations), and their domestic regulations such as the new 2015 
China Food Safety Law offers more apparatus in those regards. For example, 
China banned all U.S. poultry and related product imports in 2015 due to avian 
influenza (Reuters, 2015). More recently, China imposed more stringent 
phytosanitary standards such as restricting the allowable foreign material on 
imported soybeans from 2% to 1%, causing trouble for some soybean exporters 
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from the United States (Reuters, 2017). Therefore, in trade disputes, the United 
States should expect China to use both tariff and non-tariff tools.  
What Lessons Can Be Learned from China’s Previous Retaliations? 
Proportional, restrained response   
Currently, China has a huge overall trade surplus with the United States, and thus 
naturally wants to maintain the status quo and avoid dispute escalations. As the 
two cases above demonstrate, China tends to target agricultural commodities 
with trade flows comparable to U.S. targets in order to send a clear message. At 
the same time, China has carefully avoided escalation by choosing targets with a 
smaller trade value. The two previous cases also showed that China is willing to 
target the U.S. agricultural sector, which now holds a trade surplus with China. 
Target products that are substitutable 
In these two cases, China chose commodities that are easily substitutable across 
products and across sources. Regarding cross-product substitutability: half of the 
broiler chicken products from the United States were chicken feet, which is a 
substitutable snack food; sorghum is commonly used for feed that can be 
substituted by corn and other coarse grains. In terms of substitutability across 
sources, chicken has large domestic and international production bases, and the 
same is true for sorghum if we consider its close substitutes. The Chinese 
government actively pursues substitutability across sources by import 
diversification. For example, China allowed sorghum imports from Argentina in 
2014 after imports from the United States soared in the previous year.  
Inflict economic and political cost 
The ultimate goal of retaliatory tariffs from the perspective of China’s government 
is inflicting economic loss on politically influential interest groups in the United 
States and turning them into lobbyists for easing trade restrictions. Thus, China’s 
market as an export destination for the targeted commodities has to be important 
for U.S. producers, as is the case for broiler chicken products and sorghum. 
Furthermore, the affected U.S. producers have to be politically powerful, which 
might be why China chose agricultural products in these two cases.  
What Comes Next? 
While we do not have a crystal ball, the three principles discussed above do help 
shed light on China’s potential moves. First, we want to address the elephant in 
the room: whether China will retaliate against U.S. soybeans. The fact that China 
did not choose soybeans as the target of retaliation for the steel and aluminum 
tariff is not surprising in light of the “proportional response” principle: while 
China exports $2.8 billion of steel and aluminum products to the United States, it 
imported more than $12 billion in soybeans from the United States in 2017, and 
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more than $14 billion in 2016. Choosing soybeans at this point would be a 
dramatic escalation and deviation from China’s past strategy. 
However, if the trade dispute continues to escalate—for example, if the Trump 
administration imposes tariffs on $60 billion of Chinese imports as proposed—a 
retaliation on soybeans would be on the table as far as proportional response is 
concerned. In fact, the total value of U.S. agricultural exports to China (including 
related products) is $21 billion. Currently, China relies on soybeans from Brazil 
and the United States to supply about 90% of its soybean consumption, for feed 
predominately, and the sheer volume of the exports makes it more difficult to 
displace than other products. However, if needed to, it could shift some 
significant share of imports to other countries such as Brazil and Argentina, and 
look to replace soybeans with other products.  
Next, reviewing the list of top 10 U.S. agricultural product exports to China, it 
becomes obvious that products outside of the top 10, unless combined, do not 
have large enough trade flows to be a major part of a proportional response. 
China would likely base retaliations on the three principles outlined above, 
exploring areas where there is a high share of Chinese imports in total U.S. 
exports, a low percentage of Chinese imports from the United States when 
compared to other countries, and a low percentage of Chinese imports in world 
exports. 
The data in Table 2 provide information on the importance and substitutability of 
top agricultural and related products that the United States currently exports to 
China. To more precisely measure importance, we must take into account the 
potential impacts on producers’ profit margins, political importance (Are 
producers concentrated in important political districts?), and symbolic 
importance (Has the commodity received recent media attention or was the 
commodity recently highlighted in previous trade deals?). The substitutability 
information in this table is mainly concerned with substitution across source 
countries for Chinese imports. To better measure substitutability, we also have to 
consider substitution across products as well as nuances such as China’s trade 
relationship with competing suppliers and the seasonality of products, etc. Table 
2 shows that for most of the United States’ top export commodities to China, 
China has the potential to shift to other source countries. 
Trade relations worldwide are in a period of flux right now. The steel and 
aluminum tariff announcement triggered responses by several countries, 
although most of them were exempted later. As the cases discussed above 
highlight, China and the United States have worked through trade disputes 
before, exerting economic and political pressure on each other. The trade-
dependent U.S. agriculture system has been dragged into the trade drama before, 
and unfortunately will likely remain so as we move forward.  
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Table. 2 The importance and substitutability of top 10 U.S. 
agricultural product exports to China 
 Importance to the U.S.  Substitutability for China 
 
China-U.S. 
trade 
value in 
2017 ($ 
billion) 
China’s 
share in 
US 
exports  
U.S. share 
in China’s 
total import 
demand 
China’s 
share in 
global 
total 
imports 
Top exporters 
other than the U.S. 
Soybeans 12.36 57.3%  41.7% 63.1% Brazil (45%) Argentina (9.5%) 
Forest 
Products 3.20 33.7%  13.0% 15.2% 
Russia (18.8%) 
New Zealand (7.9%) 
Fish 
Products 1.25 18.5%  13.5% 5.7% 
Russia (19.6%) 
Canada (8.8%) 
Cotton 0.98 16.7%  33.1% 17.2% Australia (32.5%) India (12.1%) 
Hides & 
Skins 0.95 50.1%  13.6% 21.9% 
Brazil (9.7%) 
Australia (7.6%) 
Coarse 
Grains 
(ex. corn) 
0.84 78.1%  39.8% 31.8% Australia (35.3%) Canada (8.5%) 
Pork & Pork 
Products 0.66 10.2%  11.9% 14.5% 
Germany (18.2%) 
Spain (12.5%) 
Dairy 
Products 0.58 10.7%  5.1% 6.8% 
New Zealand (33%) 
Netherlands (17.2%) 
Wheat 0.35 5.7%  25.6% 2.4% Australia (40.4%) Canada (26.9%) 
Hay 0.34 27.3%  67.9% 26.5% Australia (14.0%) Canada (3.2%) 
Source: USDA FAS GATS, UN Comtrade data, and authors’ calculations. 
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